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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
A chance at a job is not a right to it. When the government 
has broad discretion to take a benefit away from its employees, 
that benefit is not a constitutionally protected property interest. 
New Jersey’s Civil Service Commission offered Claudio 
Tundo and Ruben Gilgorri such a benefit. After they were laid 
off from their jobs as corrections officers, the Commission put 
them on its rehire lists so they could be considered for rehiring. 
But it had broad discretion to take them off those lists, and it 
later did. 
Tundo and Gilgorri reasonably expected that they would 
stay on these lists forever. But the Commission has many ways 
to take anyone off its lists. And it neither promised that they 
would stay on the lists nor constrained its discretion to remove 
them. Because there was no mutually explicit understanding 
that they would stay on the lists, Tundo and Gilgorri had no 
protected property interest in doing so. We will affirm. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. New Jersey’s civil-service regulations 
The New Jersey Administrative Code sets the rules and pro-
cedures for rehiring former employees. N.J. Admin. Code 
§ 4A:4-4.8 (2019). And the Code empowers the Commission 
to handle various civil-service employment matters. It lets the 
Commission set up different categories of rehire lists of former 
employees. Id. §§ 4A:4-3.4(a)(4), 4A:4-5.5(b). Employees on 
the “special” rehire list get considered for employment ahead 
of those on other rehire lists. Id. §§ 4A:4-3.7(a)(1), 4A:8-
2.3(b)(1). And they “shall be placed” on that list “for an unlim-
ited duration.” Id. § 4A:8-2.3(c). 
But the Commission can remove employees from all types 
of lists—special or not—for many reasons. These include the 
obvious reasons, like having a criminal record, refusing to 
accept reappointment, or not following the instructions for 
staying on the lists. Id. § 4A:4-4.7(a)(3)-(4), (6). The Commis-
sion can also take employees off the lists for “[l]ack[ing] the 
job requirements,” being “physically or psychologically unfit” 
for the job, having bad employment history, or any “[o]ther 
sufficient reasons.” Id. § 4A:4-6.1(a)(1), (3), (7), (9) (emphasis 
added); accord id. § 4A:4-4.7(a)(1). Finally, it can remove em-
ployees for “[o]ther valid reasons as determined by the [Com-
mission].” Id. § 4A:4-4.7(a)(1), (11) (emphasis added). 
B. Facts 
The Passaic County Sheriff’s Office hired Tundo and Gil-
gorri as corrections officers on a trial basis. But they were poor 
5 
 
employees: they were often absent from work and were repri-
manded many times for insubordination and incompetence. So 
they were fired as part of a mass layoff even before they had 
completed their twelve-month trial period. 
But that was not the end of their road. Less than six months 
later, Passaic County needed more employees. So it asked the 
Commission to create lists of former officers whom it might 
rehire. And the Commission included both Tundo and Gilgorri 
on the lists. 
The parties dispute what type of list they were on: Tundo 
and Gilgorri claim that the Commission put them on “special” 
rehire lists. But Passaic County argues that the Commission la-
beled those lists as “revived” lists—not special lists. App. 925-
26. New Jersey law supports Passaic County’s reading: it al-
lows only former “permanent employee[s]” to be on a special 
list. N.J. Admin. Code § 4A:8-2.3(a). The two were never per-
manent employees. 
Either way, Passaic County and the Commission soon 
found themselves at odds. After the Commission issued its re-
hire lists, Passaic County tried to remove Tundo and Gilgorri 
from the lists based on their work and disciplinary history. But 
the Commission blocked this attempt and restored Tundo and 
Gilgorri to the eligible list. And it ordered Passaic County to 
place them in “a new 12-month working test period.” App. 952.  
Passaic County then offered to rehire the two and asked 
them to complete a re-employment application. This applica-
tion asked them to agree not to sue Passaic County. But they 
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did not like this, so they refused to complete the application. 
The Commission then removed them from the list. 
They responded with this lawsuit. The District Court even-
tually disposed of all their claims, including a Section 1983 
procedural-due-process claim. Tundo v. Passaic Cty., No. 09-
5062, 2018 WL 734663, at *10 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2018). They 
appeal the grant of summary judgment against them only on 
that claim, contesting the court’s holding that they did not have 
a protected property interest in staying on the rehire list. So on 
appeal, just one issue remains: do former civil-service employ-
ees in New Jersey have a property interest protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment in staying on rehire lists? 
C. Standard of review 
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 
novo. Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009). A 
district court properly grants summary judgment if the moving 
party shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We “view the facts in the light most fa-
vorable to the non-moving party and [draw] all reasonable in-
ferences in that party’s favor.” Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock 
Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
II. TUNDO AND GILGORRI HAVE NO PROTECTED PROP-
ERTY INTEREST IN STAYING ON THE REHIRE LISTS 
On appeal, Tundo and Gilgorri argue that they had a pro-
tected property interest in staying on the rehire lists. But former 
employees have no constitutionally protected property interest 
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in a benefit if the government has broad discretion to deny that 
benefit, unless it constrains that discretion. This is true even if 
the former employees had a reasonable expectation that the 
benefit would not disappear. Here, the Commission had signif-
icant discretion to take former employees off its rehire lists, 
and it never suggested that it would constrain itself. So it did 
not create a protected property interest. 
A. A protected property interest requires a mutually 
explicit understanding, not just a reasonable expectation 
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids deprivations of an in-
dividual’s “property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV, § 1; see Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 
225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006) (property interest in public employ-
ment). A protected property interest can spring from state stat-
utes, regulations, policies, or other sources that establish “a 
mutually explicit understanding between a government em-
ployer and an employee” that the employee is entitled to the 
property. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 989 F.2d 117, 120 (3d 
Cir. 1993). It can also arise from the “circumstances of . . . ser-
vice.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972). 
An employee claiming a protected property interest in a 
particular benefit must have “a legitimate claim of entitlement 
to” that benefit. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 577 (1972). That requires more than just an “abstract need 
or desire for” or a “unilateral expectation of” the benefit. Id. 
Even an employee’s reasonable expectation of the benefit is 
not enough. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 443 (1979) (per cu-
riam). Any understanding must be mutual: the government and 
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the employee must both clearly expect that the employee has 
some entitlement to the benefit. Id.  
And an employee has no protected interest in a benefit if 
the government has ample discretion to deny that benefit. See 
Anderson v. City of Philadelphia, 845 F.2d 1216, 1221 (3d Cir. 
1988). This discretion need not be absolute. It just has to be 
enough that there is no mutually explicit understanding that the 
benefit will continue.  
We recognize a protected interest in a benefit, for example, 
if the government can withhold it only “for cause.” See Rich-
ardson v. Felix, 856 F.2d 505, 511 (3d Cir. 1988) (continued 
employment); accord Sonnleitner v. York, 304 F.3d 704, 711 
(7th Cir. 2002) (demotion). The same is true if the government 
promises a benefit without leaving any room to wiggle out of 
its promise. See Stana v. Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 775 F.2d 122, 
126-27 (3d Cir. 1985).  
But we recognize no such interest if the government has 
broad discretion to terminate a benefit. So an employee has no 
protected interest if the government can fire an employee at 
will. Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2005). The 
same is true if the government has “broad discretion” not to 
hire candidates “ ‘based on job-related criteria’ ” and “ ‘stand-
ards established by the [government].’ ” Anderson, 845 F.2d at 
1221 & n.4 (quoting 4 Pa. Code § 97.16). And when the scope 
of the government’s discretion is at best ambiguous, that is “too 
slender a reed to support the weight of a constitutional right.” 
McKinney v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 915 F.3d 956, 963 (3d Cir. 
2019). 
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B. There is no property interest here because the Com-
mission had broad discretion to take employees off its re-
hire lists 
Here, the Commission has similarly broad discretion to re-
move former employees from its rehire lists. For example, it 
can take former employees off its rehire lists for lacking job 
requirements or for any “[o]ther sufficient reasons.” N.J. Ad-
min. Code § 4A:4-6.1(a)(1), (9); see id. § 4A:4-4.7(a)(1). And 
it can remove them for “[o]ther valid reasons as determined by 
the [Commission].” Id. § 4A:4-4.7(a)(11). 
True, these catchall provisions demand that the reasons be 
“sufficient” or “valid,” and those qualifiers may suggest that 
the Commission’s discretion is not absolute. But in effect, the 
government can take former employees off rehire lists if it does 
not want to hire them. And the Code lets the Commission set 
the standards for removing them. We found that a similar reg-
ulation in Anderson gave Pennsylvania agencies broad enough 
discretion. 845 F.2d at 1221 & n.4 (citing 4 Pa. Code § 97.16).  
At the very least, the scope of this discretion is too ambig-
uous to create a constitutionally protected interest. Tundo and 
Gilgorri bore the burden of resolving any ambiguity and con-
vincing us that they and the Commission both understood that 
they would stay on the lists. McKinney, 915 F.3d at 962. They 
failed to meet this burden. 
And the Commission and New Jersey courts agree with us. 
Acknowledging its broad discretion to remove individuals 
from its lists, the Commission emphasized that being on the 
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rehire list “simply provides [applicants] with another oppor-
tunity for employment.” App. 948. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court similarly found that “[n]o right accrues to a candidate 
whose name is placed on” a rehire list. In re Foglio, 22 A.3d 
958, 961 (N.J. 2011). Being on a list gives the benefit of con-
sideration for employment over others not on the list only “so 
long as that list remains in force.” Id. at 962 (quoting In re 
Crowley, 473 A.2d 90, 97 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984)) 
(emphasis added). But that is far from a vested property inter-
est. 
No other source creates a protected interest here. Tundo and 
Gilgorri point to no policy or practice that entitles them to re-
main on the rehire lists. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 601-02. And 
neither Passaic County nor the Commission communicated to 
them that they would not be removed from these lists. So they 
have shown no protected property interest in remaining on 
these lists. 
C. Stana is not to the contrary 
Tundo and Gilgorri rely heavily on Stana to support their 
claimed property interest. But they misapply that case here. In 
Stana, a teacher brought a Section 1983 claim for being re-
moved from a hire list without notice or due process. 775 F.2d 
at 124-25. We recognized the teacher’s property interest in re-
maining on the list because her school district had an explicit 
policy of keeping teachers on the lists for two to four years. Id. 
at 126. And a school official had told her that she would stay 
on the list for four years. Id. 
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Tundo and Gilgorri argue that this case is like Stana. They 
claim that, because they were on the special rehire lists, New 
Jersey promised to consider rehiring them “for an unlimited 
duration.” N.J. Admin. Code § 4A:8-2.3(c). And they claim 
that this promise, like the school district’s in Stana, created a 
protected interest in staying on the rehire lists. 
But they miss the mark. Even if we assume that they were 
on the special rehire lists, the Commission could have removed 
them for the same reasons that it could have removed them 
from other lists. As mentioned, the Commission has broad dis-
cretion to remove anyone from its lists. The school district in 
Stana did not. The only way the school district could have re-
moved Stana from its hire list was if she failed to provide in-
formation about her present status. Stana, 775 F.2d at 124. And 
unlike in Stana, the Commission made no representation to 
Tundo and Gilgorri that limited its discretion. 
Even if Tundo’s and Gilgorri’s expectation of a property 
interest in the rehire lists were reasonable, it would have been 
unilateral. The Commission promised them no permanent 
placement on the rehire lists. And it retained broad discretion 
to remove them. A promise that can be revoked at any time for 
almost any reason is no promise at all. So they had no protected 
property interest in remaining on the rehire lists. 
D. Absent a property interest, the other due-process 
considerations are irrelevant 
Tundo and Gilgorri spill much ink complaining that they 
received no notice of removal or opportunity to be heard. But 
whether they received due process matters only if they had a 
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constitutionally protected interest. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). We hold here that they did not.  
And they explain at great length that their conduct did not 
meet any of the criteria for removal. But these considerations 
are also irrelevant. A plaintiff first has to show a protected in-
terest before he can dispute the government’s power to deny it. 
A protected interest could attach to a benefit no matter how 
improperly an employee behaved. But good behavior does not 
itself create a protected interest. Here, their conduct was rele-
vant only to whether they met any of the valid criteria for re-
moval under New Jersey’s Code. That question is not before 
us.  
* * * * * 
There can be no mutually explicit understanding to create a 
protected property interest in a benefit if the government has 
broad discretion to deny that benefit. This is true even if an 
employee unilaterally and reasonably expects to keep this ben-
efit indefinitely. There is no genuine dispute about whether 
Tundo and Gilgorri had a cognizable property interest in stay-
ing on the rehire list. They did not, so we will affirm. 
